We study the structure of the rest points of signaling games and their dynamic behavior under selection-mutation dynamics by taking the case of three signals as our canonical example. Many rest points of the replicator dynamics of signaling games are not isolated and, therefore, not robust under...

We study an evolutionary game in which the individual behavior of the economic agents can lead the economy either into a low-level or a high-level equilibrium. The model represents two asymmetric populations, “leaders and followers”, where in each round an economic agent of population 1 is...

Two signaling games of monetary policy are considered: game one examines the effect of hysteresis on the labor market on the results of the repeated monetary policy game. Disciplinary effects of reputation disappear in presence of hysteresis. The second game compares weifare effects of monetary...

Although many signaling situations are best interpreted as repeated games, prior research often models them as one-shot games. We analyze a class of repeated signaling games in which the informed player's type is persistent and the history of actions are perfectly observable. In this context a...

In Sender-Receiver games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be "unambiguously" interpreted by the Receiver as coming from a unique set of possible Sender-types. The vulnerability occurs when the types in this set are the ones who gain from the...

This paper analyzes the negotiation of a non-binding treaty where agents are uninformed about each others?ability to comply with the terms of the agreement. We show that the presence of incomplete information allows the treaty to become successful under larger set of parameter conditions than...

We consider a signaling model where the senderʼs continuation value after signaling depends on his type, for instance because the receiver is able to update his posterior belief. As a leading example, we introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to...

This paper investigates the role of uncertainty as a tool to support cooperation in international environmental agreements. We consider two layers of uncertainty. Under unilateral uncertainty treaties become successful with positive probability in the signaling game, even under parameter...

We offer a closer look at screening by graduate admissions committees in their selection of student applicants, and at applicants' strategic behavior given screening methods. Essentially, a signaling game takes place between student applicants seeking to signal ability and admissions committees...

This paper examines countries’ free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and second, countries do not have complete information about other countries’ noncompliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the...