We address the coordination problem of individuals deciding to join an association that provides a public good and selective benefits to its members, when ability of the association to fulfill its purposes depends on membership size. In a global game formulation, we show that a unique...

We introduce threshold uncertainty, a la Nitzan and Romano (1990), into a private-values model of voluntary provision of a discrete public good. Players are allowed to make any level of contribution toward funding the good, which is provided only if the cost threshold is reached. Otherwise,...

We analyze a symmetric Bayesian game in which two players individually contribute to fund a discrete public good; contributions are refunded if they do not meet a threshold set by the seller of the good. We provide a general characterization of symmetric equilibrium strategies that are continuous...

We analyze the coordination problem of agents deciding to join a group that uses membership revenues to provide a discrete public good and excludable benefits. The public good and the benefits are jointly produced, so that benefits are valued only if the group succeeds in providing the public...

We reconsider Laussel and Palfrey's analysis of private provision of discrete public goods via the subscription game. We show their semi-regular equilibria do not exist, casting doubt on their efficiency analysis. Taking players' values for the public good as uniformly distributed on <formula format="inline"> <file name="jpet_375_mu1.gif" type="gif" /> </formula>, we...

Suggested contributions, membership categories, and discrete, incremental thank-you gifts are devices often used by benevolent associations that provide public goods. Such devices focus donations into discrete levels, thereby effectively limiting the donors' freedom to give. We study the effects...

This document intends to provide a discussion of issues related to tourism and local development in Apulia region (Italy), an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of current practices in related policy implementation, and recommendations and guidance on how the Apulia Government can...

We investigate the private provision of a public good whose level is determined by the maximum effort made by a group member. Costs of effort are either commonly known or privately known. For symmetric perfect-information games, any number of players may be active and we characterize the unique...