Standardization is a process through which potential rivals cooperate to have the best technological solution adopted as the next standard. They pool together financial, human and material resources. Intellectual property rights, especially patents, are a powerful tool for them to recover...

This article describes how the Court of Justice of the European Union, with its Huawei v ZTE ruling in July 2015, has attempted to prevent abuses from SEP-holders (hold-ups) and implementers (hold-outs) by balancing the interests of both sides. This decision establishes a contractual negotiation...

Abstract This paper demonstrates that credit constraints can lead to the inability to enforce contracts, thereby creating inefficiency. If time elapses between the contract period and the enforcement period, a credit constrained agent that uses the proceeds of trade to fund consumption faces a...

This paper explores the hold-up problem between two parties (an entrepreneur and an investor) when one of the parties (the entrepreneur) is unable to commit not to repudiate the initial contract. To mitigate hold-up we allow the parties to stage investments over time and derive the optimal...

Summary This is the first study to provide robust empirical foundations to a theoretical literature which so far had to assume behavioral adjustments in response to probation periods. Probation periods typically precede regular employment contracts and are commonly interpreted as a screening...

Abstract In this paper, we present two models in which the introduction of a “lender of the last resort” significantly affects the banking sector. In the first model, the introduction is stabilizing. However, in the second model it is destabilizing. Both models are very well suited to...

This paper examines the contract design problem of microfinance institutions seeking to maximize outreach to the poor while remaining financially sustainable. A dynamic model of group lending is developed that shows how optimal interest rates depend on information regarding moral hazard and...

Asymmetric information in the form of moral hazard and adverse selection can result in sizable program costs for government‐provided crop insurance plans. We present a methodology and illustrative simulations to show how these two types of information problems interact in a way to create...

We develop a theoretical model of input use by agricultural producers who purchase crop insurance, and thus may engage in moral hazard. Through simulations, our findings show a combination of partial insurance coverage and partial monitoring of inputs may reduce substantially the problems...

Purpose – The purpose of this research is examine the development of livestock mortality insurance, and associated challenges, in order to provide an improved understanding regarding the operation of livestock mortality insurance. Design/methodology/approach – In a many countries, livestock...