Purpose – Supply chain security has been recognized as an important part of managing business risks. The purpose of this paper is to propose a methodology with systematic metrics for logistics service providers (LSPs) to develop their security design to meet customer demands....

We examine information provision as a public policy instrument when products generate damages to consumers as well as environmental externalities. We show that information provision dominates taxation in terms of welfare, if information can be provided at low cost. This is because a uniform tax...

Purpose – This paper aims to explore how homelessness affects access to information serving higher‐level needs such as identity formation and social interaction. Design/methodology/approach – A multi‐disciplinary literature review informed the design of 18 semi‐structured interviews as...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to better understand dependency issues between the CEO and the board as well as the between the board and CEO through Emerson’s power dependency framework. Design/methodology/approach – A symbolic management approach is integrated with a board-CEO...

This article addresses the issue of peer monitoring and choice of contracts on the repayment behaviour of the subjects. The authors conducted a laboratory experiment using student subjects from the University of Sydney, Australia by employing profit sharing (PS) and conventional interest based...

This study examines the relationship between incentive contracts for managers and the allocation of efforts by the managers as well as the stock market’s role in monitoring allocation of the efforts. It also evaluates solvency regulation in Japan and its effects on the compensation of a manager...

Abstract The ownership and governance of for-profit (FP), nonprofit (NP), and local government (LG) organizations are different. Therefore, the objectives of these different types of organizations and their performance may differ. We conjecture that in markets where there is substantial...

Abstract This study presents a model of optimal contracting for health services in the presence of excess demand and waiting times. We assume that: i) hospitals differ in their demand for treatment; ii) potential demand is private information of the provider; iii) specialists can dump patients;...

We study policy advice by several experts with noisy private information and biased preferences. We highlight a trade-off between the truthfulness of the information revealed by each expert and the number of signals from different experts that can be aggregated to reduce noise. Contrary to...