In dynamic environments where the strategic setting evolves across time, the specific rule governing the transitions can substantially alter the incentives agents face. This is particularly true when history‐dependent strategies are used. In a laboratory study, we examine whether subjects...

We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a trade‐off between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher‐quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold...

We study preferences estimated from finite choice experiments and provide sufficient conditions for convergence to a unique underlying “true” preference. Our conditions are weak and, therefore, valid in a wide range of economic environments. We develop applications to expected utility...

We study the degree of falsifiability of theories of choice. A theory is easy to falsify if relatively small data sets are enough to guarantee that the theory can be falsified: the Vapnik–Chervonenkis (VC) dimension of a theory is the largest sample size for which the theory is “never...