This paper examines the contract design problem of microfinance institutions seeking to maximize outreach to the poor while remaining financially sustainable. A dynamic model of group lending is developed that shows how optimal interest rates depend on information regarding moral hazard and...

Asymmetric information in the form of moral hazard and adverse selection can result in sizable program costs for government‐provided crop insurance plans. We present a methodology and illustrative simulations to show how these two types of information problems interact in a way to create...

Purpose – The purpose of this research is examine the development of livestock mortality insurance, and associated challenges, in order to provide an improved understanding regarding the operation of livestock mortality insurance. Design/methodology/approach – In a many countries, livestock...

Purpose – In Australia broadacre crops can be insured against hail and fire damage and some other perils but not against losses caused by drought, flood or frost. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the private provision of crop insurance in Western Australia....

Purpose This paper aims to achieve scale, efficiency and mitigate high monitoring costs, and explores the efficacy of micro equity finance at the enterprise level. The study compares the economic features of the proposed framework with interest-based debt finance. Design/methodology/approach...

This paper examines the design of social investment funds (SIFs) and explores the ways they affect agents' incentives to propose, select, and implement good projects. Compared with other forms of decentralized service provision, SIFs possess features of administratively delegated authority and...

Summary This is the first study to provide robust empirical foundations to a theoretical literature which so far had to assume behavioral adjustments in response to probation periods. Probation periods typically precede regular employment contracts and are commonly interpreted as a screening...

Abstract In this paper, we present two models in which the introduction of a “lender of the last resort” significantly affects the banking sector. In the first model, the introduction is stabilizing. However, in the second model it is destabilizing. Both models are very well suited to...

We develop a theoretical model of input use by agricultural producers who purchase crop insurance, and thus may engage in moral hazard. Through simulations, our findings show a combination of partial insurance coverage and partial monitoring of inputs may reduce substantially the problems...