In absence of deposit insurance, underdeveloped financial systems can exhibit a coordination failure between banks, unable to commit on safe asset holding, and depositors, anticipating low deposit repayment in bad states. This paper shows conditions under which a government can solve this...

Financial regulation affects government revenue whenever it imposes both the mandatory quantity and price of government bonds. This paper studies a banking regulation adopted by the National Bank of Ethiopia in April 2011, which forces all private banks to purchase a fixed negative-yield...

Financial regulation affects government revenue whenever it imposes both the mandatory quantity and price of government bonds. This paper studies a banking regulation adopted by the National Bank of Ethiopia in April 2011, which forces all private banks to purchase a fixed negative-yield...

In absence of deposit insurance, underdeveloped financial systems can exhibit a coordination failure between banks, unable to commit on safe asset holding, and depositors, anticipating low deposit repayment in bad states. This paper shows conditions under which a government can solve this...

Financial regulation can generate government revenue by imposing the quantity and price of government bonds. We study an unexpected banking regulation introduced in 2011 by the Ethiopian Central Bank, forcing commercial banks to purchase a negative-yield government bond. High-frequency bank data...

Liquidity requirements can stimulate deposit growth by increasing depositor repayment in bad states, which can also promote lending and branching. We study an unexpected policy change which fostered the liquid assets of Ethiopian banks by 33% in 2011, and present three findings in line with this...