While it is widely believed by academics, politicians and the popular press that incumbent members of Congress are rewarded by the electorate for bringing federal dollars to their district, the empirical evidence supporting that claim is extremely weak. One explanation for the failure to uncover...

This paper introduces preliminary evidence from a cross-country database of policy characteristics and potential uses of that database. While most databases have emphasized either the content of policies (e.g., size of government deficits) or countries&' formal institutions (e.g., political...

We investigate the extent to which the intensity of political competition moderates the governance issues that arise in relation to Canada’s fiscal structure. By fiscal structure we mean three distinct but interrelated fiscal dimensions of the state: financial stability, long run size and...

Pork-barrel spending is the use of federal money for localized projects that yield only a narrow geographic benefit. It is a commonly held belief that politicians use this spending to improve their chances of re-election. One way that an incumbent can increase their chances of re-election is...

... Die vorliegende Arbeit stützt sich deshalb auf eine institutionell bedingte Veränderung derBeteiligung, die Einführung des Frauenstimmrechts, um den Effekt einer kontrolliertenAusweitung des Elektorats auf die Staatsausgaben zu untersuchen. Das institutionelle Labor Schweiz erlaubt dabei...

The goal of this paper is twofold: First, to develop an estimable model of legislative politics in the US Congress, second, to provide a greater understanding of the objectives behind the New Deal. In the theoretical model, the distribution of federal funds across regions of the country is the...

Using an estimation method developed by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) we study whether the size of a country's legislature impacts its fiscal response to common and country-specific shocks. The use of this method allows us to estimate the effects of legislature size while also controlling for...