Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 711
Cover Image
Behavioural responses to unfair institutions : experimental evidence on rule compliance, norm polarisation, and trust
Columbus, Simon; Feld, Lars P.; Kasper, Matthias; … - 2023
and social norms, and trust. In a preregistered online experiment (n = 1,038), we find that biased institutions reduce … compared to no enforcement. We also find that social heterogeneity lowers average trust and induces ingroup favouritism in … trust. Finally, we find consistent evidence of peer effects: higher levels of peer compliance raise future compliance and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014319160
Cover Image
Behavioural responses to unfair institutions : experimental evidence on rule compliance, norm polarisation, and trust
Columbus, Simon; Feld, Lars P.; Kasper, Matthias; … - 2023
and social norms, and trust. In a preregistered online experiment (n = 1,038), we find that biased institutions reduce … compared to no enforcement. We also find that social heterogeneity lowers average trust and induces ingroup favouritism in … trust. Finally, we find consistent evidence of peer effects: higher levels of peer compliance raise future compliance and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321962
Cover Image
Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships : an experiment
Crosetto, Paolo; Gaudeul, Alexia; Riener, Gerhard - 2014
We explore in an experiment what leads to the breakdown of partnerships. Subjects are assigned a partner and participate in a repeated public good game with stochastic outcomes. They can choose each period between staying in the public project or working on their own. There is excessive exit as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340746
Cover Image
Procrastination and projects
Külpmann, Philipp - 2015
In this paper I analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players are working together to achieve a breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The effort needed to achieve such a breakthrough is unknown but players have a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304680
Cover Image
Split It Up to Create Incentives : Investment, Public Goods and Crossing the River
Martin, Simon - 2020
When should one pay the ferryman? When to pay for the delivery of a good and how to invest in a public good if there is a single transaction and institutions are costly? We show how to solve the hold-up problem. The idea is to appropriately split up the desired total contribution into several...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848109
Cover Image
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
Masuda, Takehito; Okano, Yoshitaka; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi - 2013
We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332274
Cover Image
Communication in asymmetric group competition over public goods
Zhang, Jingjing - 2012
This paper examines whether and how cheap talk communication can facilitate within-group coordination when two unequal sized groups compete for a prize that is shared equally among members of the winning group, regardless of their (costly) contributions to the group's success. We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316824
Cover Image
Growing groups, cooperation, and the rate of entry
Ranehill, Eva; Schneider, Frédéric; Weber, Roberto A. - 2013
We study the stability of voluntary cooperation in response to varying group growth rates. Using a laboratory public-good game, we construct a situation where increasing group size yields potential efficiency gains, but only with sustained cooperation. We then study the effect of exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316831
Cover Image
Teams contribute more and punish less
Auerswald, Heike; Schmidt, Carsten; Thum, Marcel; … - 2016
Challenges in global politics like climate change, maritime piracy and fighting highly contagious diseases concern global public goods. The related policy decisions are mostly made by teams. In contrast, economic models of global public goods typically assume a single rational decision-maker. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539568
Cover Image
Fundraising through competition : evidence from the lab
Orzen, Henrik - 2008
This paper investigates mechanisms for the private provision of a public good which utilize competition to incentivize contributions. Theory predicts that 'all-pay' competition is particularly effective for fundraising. Within this class of mechanisms different types of lotteries and all-pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003759118