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Control rights in public-private partnerships
Francesconi, Marco (contributor);  … - 2006
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two parties that produce impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties' valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003392741
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Control Rights in Public-Private Partnerships
Francesconi, Marco - 2006
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two parties that produce impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties' valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012780020
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Chapter 3. Property Rights, Public Goods and the Environment
Starrett, David A. - In: Handbook of environmental economics : volume 1, …, (pp. 97-125). 2003
We delineate the various ways in which rights to environmental and other resources can be assigned to individuals or groups. We then examine models of individual and group interactions, drawing out their implications for the ways in which resources will be utilized and managed under various...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023942
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Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy
Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-256
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694996
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Dynamic tax externalities and the U.S. fiscal transformation in the 1930s
Niepelt, Dirk - 2018
We propose a theory of tax centralization in politico-economic equilibrium. Taxation has dynamic general equilibrium … spending and taxation and create a role for inter governmental grants. The model provides an explanation for the centralization …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011810615
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Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game : theory and experimental evidence
İriş, Doruk; Lee, Jungmin; Tavoni, Alessandro - 2016
evenly among the team members, including the delegate. We find that delegation causes a small reduction in the group …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011457585
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The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems : a survey of experimental research
Dannenberg, Astrid; Gallier, Carlo - 2019
A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010446
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The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems : a survey of experimental research
Dannenberg, Astrid; Gallier, Carlo - 2019
A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010646
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Guilt in voting and public good games
Rothenhäusler, Dominik; Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - 2016
This paper analyzes how moral costs affect individual support of morally difficult group decisions. We study a threshold public good game with moral costs. Motivated by recent empirical findings, we assume that these costs are heterogeneous and consist of three parts. The first one is a standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011567880
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Externality assessments, welfare judgments, and mechanism design
Daske, Thomas - 2017
How agents assess the (in-)tangible externalities that others might impose on them can strongly influence strategic … externalities, are all subject to asymmetric information; utility is quasi-linear and transferable. An allocation rule will be …-balanced transfers if and only if it maximizes the sum of private payoffs exclusive of externalities. The corresponding mechanism is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011773839