We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the …' corruptibility but is not sufficient to eliminate the Tragedy of corruption that leads both firms and officials to earn less than in … the absence of corruption. …

relationship is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large … corruption environments. We find that corruption leads to more pessimistic beliefs about others' contributions in heterogeneous … groups, and this is an important mechanism explaining our results. In doing so, we highlight the indirect costs of corruption …

relationship is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large … corruption environments. We find that corruption leads to more pessimistic beliefs about others' contributions in heterogeneous … groups, and this is an important mechanism explaining our results. In doing so, we highlight the indirect costs of corruption …

We present controlled experimental evidence on how corruption affects the private provision of public goods. Subjects … subjects. We compare average contributions between two conditions with the same efficiency: a corruption condition, where an … administrator can expropriate part of contributions, and a control condition without corruption. Compared to the control condition …

Does corruption increase or decrease with public goods spending? I develop a model of public good provision by a rent … decrease corruption (in the form of bribes) if the marginal social value of the public goods from which the bribes are … effect on public spending, but unambiguously increases corruption (in the form of theft). Hence, a political resource curse …

We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective failure is …' corruptibility but is not sufficient to eliminate the tragedy of corruption altogether …