This paper studies the impact of ambiguity in the best shot and weakest link models of public good provision. The models are first analysed theoretically. Then we conduct experiments to study how ambiguity affects behaviour in these games. We test whether subjects' perception of ambiguity...

A robust finding in economics is that decision-makers often exhibit a much smaller dollar willingness to pay (WTP) for an item than the minimum amount that they claim to be willing to accept (WTA) to part with it. The spread between these two numbers is particularly large for public goods,...

This paperwork relates Overconfidence and Underconfidence behavioral profiles on individuals, along with their common decisions under risk. Beginning with a psychometric stratification based on the concept of calibration and then adding simple risk choices, this paper shows results suggesting...

Cooperation problems are at the heart of many everyday situations. In this paper, we propose a very simple and light-handed mechanism to sustain cooperation and test its performance in a rich laboratory environment. The mechanism moderates cooperation by controlling experiences, more...

We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning...

The public goods problem or the “tragedy of the commons,” (Hardin, 1968) either viewed as a problem of extraction or that of contribution has had a rich history in Economics and indeed in other social sciences like Anthropology, Sociology and Political Science. Our research examines free...

Altruistic punishment is often thought to be a major enforcement mechanism of social norms. I present experimental results from a modified version of the dictator game with third-party punishment, in which third parties can remain ignorant about the choice of the dictator. I find that a...