This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal...

This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sj¨ostr¨om, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sj¨ostr¨om, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal...

We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each period, there is a societal endowment which can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the optimal public policy, defined by the time path of...

This paper shows that Smith has applied a wrong theory to explain public good financing. The result will be insufficient fund for any public project. Instead of encouraging people to honestly reveal their preference, Smith is encouraging them to cheat

The paper starts from the hypothesis that the public good index (PGI) could be much more successful if it were introduced by a more prominent game theorist. It argues that the violation of local monotonicity, inherent to this measure of a priori voting power, can be an asset – especially if...

We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but (partially) group strategy-proof as well, in appropriate domains of definition. That is the case for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, the uniform rule and the top...

We delineate the various ways in which rights to environmental and other resources can be assigned to individuals or groups. We then examine models of individual and group interactions, drawing out their implications for the ways in which resources will be utilized and managed under various...

We observe that many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but also (partially) group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation and auctions, in spite of the...

This article uses economic categories to show how the reorganization of civil procedure in the case of class action is not merely aimed at providing a more efficient litigation technology, as hierarchies (and company law) might do for other productive activities, but that it also serves to...

A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining...