Das Forschungsvorhaben befasst sich mit der Frage, ob es möglich ist, über die sozioemotionale Bindung an einen Raum (place) und damit verbundene Prozesse des Place-making neue Formen regionaler Selbststeuerung (Regional Governance) auszulösen, die das Management natürlicher Ressourcen...

The levels of public goods provided by government are determined in part by the form of political institutions in a country. Countries governed by democratic institutions arguably will provide public goods at different levels than countries ruled by autocrats or an elite group. To examine this...

This paper examines the link between pollution and income. It shows how income inequality affects environmental policies and therefore pollution. The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis proposes that there is an inverted U-shape relation between environmental degradation and income per...

In this paper we consider various privatisation mechanisms in a general equilibrium model. We show that privatisation has no real effects, if the public sector is efficient and lump-sum taxes are implemented. The free distribution of public assets is financially neutral, whereas the sale of...

We examine the effect of immigration on public spending from a theoretical (political economic) and an empirical perspective. We distinguish between public spending on private goods and on public goods. Our model implies that whether immigration increases or decreases public spending primarily...

Mitgliedzwang in Kollektiven wird mit dem Argument verteidigt, dass nur so der gewöhnlich unerfahrene Kunde einer beruflichen Leistung vor schadhafter Arbeit mit eventuell katastrophalen Folgen geschützt sei: die Zwangsmitgliedschaft als typischer Fall zur Aufhebung oder Abmilderung...

We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other...

In a competitive-equilibrium analysis of giving to charity, we show that strategic complementarity between individual giving and aggregate giving can lead to multiple equilibria. This provides a possible explanation for observed heterogeneity in giving. It is possible, but not necessary, that at...

Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a "productive state". At heart of...

This paper revisits the question of framing and the provision of public goods. It also addresses the question, is giving in Dictator Games an expression of altruism or an artefact of experimentation? What is unique about this paper is that we employ a real donationʺ lab experiment in a...