Similar Search Results

Transfers or public good provision? : A political allocation perspective

Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000854809

The likelihood of inefficiency, a prisoner's dilemma and suboptimality in games of binary voluntary provision of public goods

Nitsan, Shemuʾel - In: Social choice and welfare 11 (1994) 2, pp. 157-164

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001162455

Transfers or public good provision? : A political allocation perspective

Nitsan, Shemuʾel - In: Economics letters 45 (1994) 4, pp. 451-457

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001164464

Prize sharing in collective contests

Nitzan, Shmuel; Ueda, Kaoru - 2010

The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed privatepublic good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335975

Transfers or public good provision? : A political allocation perspective

Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000892268

Private provision of public goods in differential games

Gaitsgory, Vladimir A.; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000856527

Voluntary participation and the provision of public and private goods

Grâdšṭayn, Marq - 1987

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000732145

Private provision of a discrete public good with uncertain cost

Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Romano, Richard E. - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000798545

Binary participation and incremental provision of public goods

Grâdšṭayn, Marq; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000769094

Prize sharing in collective contests

Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Ueda, Kaoru - 2010

The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed private-public good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008697815