Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

In the two-person sequential best shot game, first player 1 contributes to a public good and then player 2 is informed about this choice before contributing. The payoff from the public good is the same for both players and depends only on the maximal contribution. Efficient voluntary cooperation...

We design a transboundary public goods (TPG) game, in which participants have simultaneous interaction within and between groups. We design the TPG game under an infinitely repeated situation in order to explore the types of strategies that participants employ in infinitely repeated games. We...

We extend public goods game and design transboundary public goods game which players receive more information from the local group, and marginal return per capital (MPCR) is heterogeneous across local groups that high MPCR among local groups and low MPCR among counter groups. We experimentally...

A growing body of literature in experimental economics examines how cognitive ability affects cooperation in social dilemma settings. We contribute to the existing literature by studying this relationship in a more complex and strategic environment when the number of partners increases in an...

A growing body of literature in experimental economics examines how cognitive ability affects cooperation in social dilemma settings. We contribute to the existing literature by studying this relationship in a more complex and strategic environment when the number of partners increases in an...

This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking model with two groups where within-group cooperation is supported through the use of a double-edged trigger...

We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage, players simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to influence the government's choice on...

A standard justification for state intervention and regulation is the market failure known as public goods. Assuming the private market cannot appropriately react to the true demand for public goods, the regulator must decide which goods to supply and in what quantity. A regulator wishing to...

This paper studies resource-allocation mechanisms by using a reduced-form notion of mechanism. We formulate a mechanism by specifying the state space of the mechanism, the set of outcomes that agents can induce in a given state, and the set of admissible outcomes in each state. This notion of...