In a paper delivered at the December 1955 meeting of the Econometric Society, Paul Samuelson noted that though economists had done "work of high quality and great quantity in the field of taxation," the theory of public expenditure had been "relatively neglected" (1958, 332). Anglo-American...

In this paper I study optimal demand by an agent who faces a budget constraint that may not be linear. This situation arises in public good economies in which production of the public good does not exhibit constant returns to scale and in which each agent is responsible for a fixed proportion of...

This paper examines the effects of a global club good opportunity on local public good provision when interactions are indefinitely repeated linear public good game setting with a voluntary contribution mechanism. In particular, the study varies the global club entry cost and the local community...

We use a simple balanced budget contest to collect taxes on a private good in order to ?nance a pure public good. We show that-with an appropriately chosen structure of winning probabilities-this contest can provide the public good efficiently and without distorting private consumption. We...

We use a simple balanced budget contest to collect taxes on a private good in order to finance a pure public good. We show that-with an appropriately chosen structure of winning probabilities-this contest can provide the public good efficiently and without distorting private consumption. We...

We revisit the classical result that taxation of private consumption is distortionary and therefore precludes the efficient provision of public goods. We introduce a nonlinear consumption tax which we call a `tax lottery'. Under this scheme, an ad-valorem consumption tax is supplemented with a...

Share equilibrium was introduced in van den Nouweland and Wooders (2011) as an extension of Lindahl's original equilibrium concept (Lindahl, 1919) to local public good economies. The current paper contains a comprehensive study of the possible share equilibrium outcomes of symmetric individuals,...

We analyze a game in which a group of agents exert costly effort over time to make progress on a project. The project is completed once the cumulative efforts reach a pre-specified threshold, at which point it generates a lump sum payoff. We characterize a budget balanced mechanism that induces...

Share equilibrium was introduced in van den Nouweland and Wooders (2011) as an extension of Lindahl's original equilibrium concept (Lindahl, 1919) to local public good economies. The current paper contains a comprehensive study of the possible share equilibrium outcomes of symmetric individuals,...

The paper explores organizations designed to influence a group to choose specific alternatives from a set of possible choices. The perspective is that of an administrator that has personal objectives not shared by the group and can dictate organization but not group choice. The design works...