This paper studies the impact of ambiguity in the best shot and weakest link models of public good provision. The models are first analysed theoretically. Then we conduct experiments to study how ambiguity affects behaviour in these games. We test whether subjects' perception of ambiguity...

A robust finding in economics is that decision-makers often exhibit a much smaller dollar willingness to pay (WTP) for an item than the minimum amount that they claim to be willing to accept (WTA) to part with it. The spread between these two numbers is particularly large for public goods,...

This paperwork relates Overconfidence and Underconfidence behavioral profiles on individuals, along with their common decisions under risk. Beginning with a psychometric stratification based on the concept of calibration and then adding simple risk choices, this paper shows results suggesting...

Reliable institutions - i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep - foment cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When...

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...