This paper compares the effects of two leadership styles: leading by pre-game communication and leading by example … using an iterated voluntary contribution game. We find that pre-game communication increases the level of individual …-game communication. We also find that the content of pre-game communication has a higher impact on individual decisions than the ex post …

We examine communication in a 2-player sequential public good game in which the leader has private information about … deciding whether or not to contribute. Without communication, the unique equilibrium is fully efficient. We study whether the … introduction of communication about returns can destroy efficiency. Communication can be precise (about the exact return), or vague …

We analyze communication about the social returns to investment in a public good. We model two agents who have private …, equilibrium communication features "denial" about the returns, depressing contributions. We illustrate the model in the context of …

We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game …

We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game …

We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game …

, we only find a small and temporary effect of identification, irrespective of the type of communication. The reason for …