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relationship is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large … corruption environments. We find that corruption leads to more pessimistic beliefs about others' contributions in heterogeneous … groups, and this is an important mechanism explaining our results. In doing so, we highlight the indirect costs of corruption …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012305896
relationship is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large … corruption environments. We find that corruption leads to more pessimistic beliefs about others' contributions in heterogeneous … groups, and this is an important mechanism explaining our results. In doing so, we highlight the indirect costs of corruption …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012301914
We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the …' corruptibility but is not sufficient to eliminate the Tragedy of corruption that leads both firms and officials to earn less than in … the absence of corruption. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011528171
We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective failure is …' corruptibility but is not sufficient to eliminate the tragedy of corruption altogether …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013002821
This paper studies public goods provision in an experiment in which contributors repeatedly interact with rent-extracting administrators. Our main result is that the presence of an administrator reduces contributions but only because rent extraction lowers the MPCR. Analysing the dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012927572
This paper studies public goods provision in an experiment in which contributors repeatedly interact with rent-extracting administrators. Our main result is that the presence of an administrator reduces contributions but only because rent extraction lowers the MPCR. Analysing the dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929025
This paper studies public goods provision in an experiment in which contributors repeatedly interact with rent-extracting administrators. Our main result is that the presence of an administrator reduces contributions but only because rent extraction lowers the MPCR. Analysing the dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011778679
When do resource revenues increase corruption? I develop a model of public good provision by a politician who obtains … revenues unambiguously increase public goods spending, and decrease corruption (in the form of bribes) if the marginal social … increases corruption (in the form of theft). Hence, a political resource curse emerges when resources provide ‘too much …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014083193
citizens. -- Mass Media ; Corruption ; Selection and Discipline of Politicians …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003931041
In this paper, we analyze the nature of cooperation in different corruption regimes. In a laboratory experiment with … university students in Mexico, individuals play first a corruption game and then a public goods game. The corruption game is … results. First, there is more corruption in the low-monitoring group. Second, in the public goods game there is less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011885664