We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of … international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without … becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which …

&S preferences. Stability of the grand coalition is never reached, but potential internally stable grand coalitions are achieved … eines globalen öffentlichen Gutes – z.B. Klimaschutz - eingeführt. Spieler tragen – wenn sie einer Koalition beitreten …

This paper considers endogenous coalition formations and endogenous technology choices in a model of private provision … contributions by a strategic incentive to adopt lower technology to motivate coalition building by other nations, which in the end …

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of … international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without … becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which …

. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston …

our model and experiments, introducing a coalition formation stage prior to making a contribution decision enables sorting …

coalition to coordinate provision. Compared with games with only goods (or only bads) we find larger coalitions in equilibrium …. Specifically, we analyze a game with quadratic benefit- and cost functions and we find the grand coalition to be stable except for … situations where agents have identical or almost identical characteristics. The main driving force of coalition stability is that …

schemes in order to influence the government’s choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition …