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Identity, grievances, and economic determinants of voting in the 2007 Kenyan elections

Kimenyi, Mwangi S.; Romero, Roxana Gutierrez - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003866738

Aimone, Jason A.; Butera, Luigi; Stratmann, Thomas - 2014

between two potential policy outcomes of an election participate in large-scale elections when voting is costly? Using a … is costly and the voter has no monetary stake in the election outcome. In our sample, we observe that at least fourteen … they have no pecuniary interest in the election outcome. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010393636

Altruistic punishment in elections

Aimone, Jason A.; Butera, Luigi; Stratmann, Thomas - In: European journal of political economy 53 (2018), pp. 149-160

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011973309

Separation of powers, political competition and efficient provision of public goods

Boukouras, Aristotelis; Koufopoulos, Kostas - 2011 - This Version: 03 September 2010, First Version: 28 September 2007

In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343846

The Effect of Voting on Contributions in a Public Goods Game

le Sage, Sander - 2015

This paper reports the results of a public good experiment with voting. The standard game in which subjects decide simultaneously on their contributions to a public good is extended by a second stage. In this stage, subjects can express agreement or disagreement with the contributions of their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017455

Is voting for a cartel a sign of cooperativeness?

Gillet, Joris - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-10

This paper tests the hypothesis that a (partial) reason why cartels - collective but costly and non-binding price agreements - lead to higher prices in a Bertrand oligopoly could be because of a selection effect: decision-makers who are willing to form price agreements are more likely to be less...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547790