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Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014

equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693

Play it again : partner choice, reputation building and learning in restarting, finitely-repeated dilemma games

Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis G. - 2013

remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation … forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia …, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126752

Bayesian repeated games and reputation

Salomon, Antoine; Forges, Françoise - In: Journal of economic theory 159 (2015), pp. 70-104

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011549037

Strategic experimentation : the case of poisson bandits

Cripps, Martin; Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - 2002

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players have access to two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lumpsum payoffs according to a Poisson process with unknown intensity. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410236

Bandits in the lab

Hoelzemann, Johannes; Klein, Nicolas Alexandre - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 12 (2021) 3, pp. 1021-1051

We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012598548

Strategic experimentation with exponential bandits

Cripps, Martin; Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - 2003 - This version: July 9, 2003

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield a payoff only after some exponentially distributed random time. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440933

Coevolution of cooperation, preferences, and cooperative signals in social dilemmas

Müller, Stephan; Wangenheim, Georg von - 2016

We study the coevolution of cooperation, preferences and cooperative signals in an environment where individuals engage in a signaling-extended prisoner's dilemma. We identify a new type of evolutionary equilibrium - a transitional equilibrium - which is constituted and stabilized by the dynamic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526375

Coevolution of Cooperation, Preferences, and Cooperative Signals in Social Dilemmas

Müller, Stephan - 2019

We study the coevolution of cooperation, preferences, and cooperative signals in an environment where individuals engage in a signaling-extended prisoner's dilemma. We prove the existence of a cooperative equilibrium constituted by a (set of) limit cycle(s) and stabilized by the dynamic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012868653

Coevolution of cooperation, preferences, and cooperative signals in social dilemmas

Müller, Stephan; Wangenheim, Georg von - 2019 - Revised version June 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018665

Cooperation in public goods games : stay, but not for too long

Wardil, Lucas; Amaral, Marco Antonio - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-10

Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709307

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