In this study, we examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the MPCR is held constant despite the coordination problems...

We examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the marginal per capita return (MPCR), i.e. the return to each participant from...

We examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the marginal per capita return (MPCR), i.e. the return to each participant from...

This paper examines the differences of two alternative decentralized selective incentives, punishment and reward, in the condition of random-matched public goods experiments. We also provide a robust analysis by varying the effectiveness of punishment(reward), that is the amount by which a...

In this communication, a simple mechanism in the optional public goods game is experimentally investigated using two experimental settings; and first time, the cyclic strategy pattern in full state space is demonstrated by means of velocity. It is, furthermore, elaborated that the strategies of...

This is the first study on the relationship between fluctuation and equilibrium in repeated game experiment. We define fluctuation as the strategy movements. In public goods game, for example, fluctuation of an individual is the abstract value of the difference of contribution between one period...