This paper investigates symmetric equilibria in first- and second-price auctions with multidimensional types. The constructed model mirrors the information structure of actual procurement auctions. We demonstrate by a counterexample that symmetric and continuous type distribution is not a...

We consider a Green Public Procurement setting where the procurer provides a bid discount to environment-friendly technologies to foster their use. We assume that, before the auction, firms may switch to green technology via a publicly observable costly investment. We show that investment acts...

The third chapter, co-authored with Gyula Seres, delves into the efficiency of mechanism design in the field of public procurement auctions. Using a novel dataset with public contracts for highway construction in Poland, we analyze effects of screening, i.e. rejections of offers that do not...

Procuring authorities frequently use screening in order to mitigate risky bids. This study estimates the effect of bid screening and litigation on entry and bidding using a unique data set on highway construction procurement auctions in Poland. The market exhibits a screening method that ex...

Procuring authorities frequently use screening to mitigate default risk. However, eliminating bidders reduces competition and may discourage entry. This study estimates the effect of screening and litigation using a unique data set on highway construction procurement auctions in Poland. The...

We consider a Green Public Procurement setting where the procurer provides a bid discount to environment-friendly technologies to foster their use. We assume that, before the auction, firms may switch to green technology via a publicly observable costly investment. We show that investment acts...