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Time consistency and bureaucratic budget competition
Kessing, Sebastian G.; Konrad, Kai A. - 2006
High employment protection in the public sector results in strategic over-employment if government divisions compete for budgets in a dynamic setting. Bureaucrats who are interested in maximising their divisions' output employ excess labor, since this induces the sponsor to provide complementary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263971
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Administrative budgets in the Irish civil service
1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000960941
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Time consistency and bureaucratic budget competition
Konrad, Kai A.; Kessing, Sebastian - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 118 (2008), pp. 1-15
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003599956
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Shrouded costs of government : the political economy of state and local public pensions
Glaeser, Edward L.; Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009744183
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Shrouded costs of government : the political economy of state and local public pensions
Glaeser, Edward L.; Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M. - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720482
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Time consistency and bureaucratic budget competition
Kessing, Sebastian (contributor); Konrad, Kai A. (contributor) - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003365200
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Time Consistency and Bureaucratic Budget Competition
Kessing, Sebastian G. - 2006
High employment protection in the public sector results in strategic over-employment if government divisions compete for budgets in a dynamic setting. Bureaucrats who are interested in maximising their divisions' output employ excess labor, since this induces the sponsor to provide complementary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779343