In their pursuit of being elected, politicians might not provide their constituents with independent viewpoints, but …, "candor", can be sustained as equilibria. This means that the public's trust or distrust in politicians may be self …-fulfilling prophecies. Importantly, the more informed politicians are about public opinion, the more likely it is that populist behavior can …

voters' capacity to identify and empower well-suited politicians. In our model, candidates are heterogeneous in two … concentration of power in the hands of the election winner is optimal if and only if the conflict of interest is small. …

voters' capacity to identify and empower competent politicians. In our model, candidates are privately informed about their … motivation. In particular, full concentration of power is desirable if and only if politicians are mostly welfare-oriented. The …

the release of information? Using Brazilian elections and audits as an exogenous source of information, I show that both … competitiveness of elections and, therefore, candidates' spending. Only information disclosed prior to electoral campaigns impacts …