This article examines the decades-long decline of investor protections enshrined in the Securities Act of 1933, most notably Section 11, which imposes near strict liability on corporate insiders and certain secondary actors, primarily underwriters. The provision, the most potent in the federal...

A growing number of policymakers and scholars are calling for tougher rules to curb corporate acquisitions. But these appeals are premature. There is currently little evidence to suggest that mergers systematically harm consumer welfare. More importantly, scholars fail to identify alternative...

This Article offers an assessment of the preliminary evidence that the market for corporate control functions as a disciplinary mechanism for poor corporate governance in Korea. It analyzes SK Corporation's fight against Sovereign Asset Management, contest for control over the Hyundai Group,...

This paper sheds light on a structural problem affecting all M&A laws: deals are complex and unique, while the law is general. In particular, target companies have a particular ownership structure that must fit the paradigm contemplated by the law, which in the European Union consists almost...

The regulation of hostile takeovers constitutes an interesting corporate governance microcosm. It is an area where clear contrasts in approach, regarding the balance of power between shareholders and the board of directors, are evident across different jurisdictions. Takeovers also reflect the...

We find that classified board in the M&A target firm is positively related to the target shareholder value, but only for firms with both intensive R&D investment and strong external governance. We also find that firms with classified board exhibit superior quality innovation when they have both...

We revisit the research question centering around the impact of the market for corporate control on stock price crash risk. Using a newly-developed takeover index from Cain, McKeon, and Solomon (2017) that comprehensively considers existing state takeover laws, federal statutes, and state court...

We reexamine the negative relation between firm value and the number of antitakeover provisions a firm has in place. We document that firms with characteristics indicating low power to bargain for favorable terms in a takeover, but also indicating high potential agency costs, have more...

Many years ago, Henry Manne proposed a theory of the market for corporate control that provided a compelling argument for the existence of a vibrant hostile takeover market. He argued that “the control of corporations may constitute a valuable asset” if the acquirer takes control with the...

This draft explores the takeover war between Vanke (target) and Baoneng Group (bidder) and related issues on hostile takeovers in China. The Vanke-Baoneng case (hereinafter Vanke case) has raised many questions about corporate governance, a market for corporate control, market institutions,...