We argue that mainstream FDI theory underplays financial motivations for interna-tional investment, and suggest several possible channels for a distinct cost-of-capital effect on FDI. Using a sample of European firms' cross-border acquisitions, and controlling for traditional firm-level...

Private equity buyouts have become a common element in the industrial development process. I survey the literature on the real economic effect of buyouts: employment, wages, productivity, and long-run investments. Employment tend to marginally fall after a buyout in most countries studied, with...

This paper explores the impact of target CEOs' retirement preferences on the incidence, the pricing, and the outcomes of takeover bids. Mergers frequently force target CEOs to retire early, and CEOs' private merger costs are the forgone benefits of staying employed until the planned retirement...

The world of mergers and acquisitions are often fraught with change, loss of identity and uncertainty for the workers who remain. The consolidation of work-groups can result in new roles, unfamiliar faces, new social structure and the introduction of foreign processes. The need to quickly...

Anecdotal evidence suggests that uncontrolled managers let wages rise above competitive levels. To test this belief, we examine the wage impact of antitakeover legislation passed throughout the 1980s in many states. Since many view hostile takeovers as an important disciplining device, these...

I analyze the allocation of the power to decide on hostile takeovers between directors and shareholders. My contribution is to show who actually has power in a takeover and what factors are at work to give such power. Although directors are traditionally considered to be in charge in deciding...

A great merger wave occurring in the United States between 1897 and 1903 was the single most important event in a process that yielded the pattern of managerial control and dispersed share ownership which currently distinguishes America's corporate economy from arrangements in most other...

Leveraged buyouts (LBO) are generally explained in terms of a governance mechanism that disciplines management. It is operationalized by increasing the leverage of a firm, which has an implicit consequence of constraining management in the use of free cash flows. However, under a relatively new...

Acquirers do not benefit from hiring the CEOs of firms they buy, either in terms of merger announcement returns or long-run operating performance. This is especially true when the retained CEOs exhibit inferior quality (as proxied by target firm industrial efficiency or the target CEO's...