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Corporate governance
Lehmann, Erik - 2018 - Version , November 19th 2018
markets and contracts, adverse selection and moral hazard problems occur, where delegated (selected) managers could act in … aspect is about identifying the (most) relevant stakeholder(s), separating theory and practice into two different and … conflicting streams: the stakeholder value approach and the shareholder value approach. The second aspect of the concept is about …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011928257
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Do Bad Boards Allow Bad Acquisitions?
Pandit, Shail - 2009
A large proportion of acquisitions results in shareholder wealth destruction. This study examines who is responsible for allowing bad acquisitions. Using a sample of 349 tax-free, stock-for-stock, pooling acquisitions over 1993-2001, the announcement period abnormal returns of acquirers are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014046835
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How Managerial Ownership and the Market for Corporate Control Can Improve Investment Timing
Guthrie, Graeme - 2020
We show how CEO ownership and the market for corporate control interact to influence the investment-timing decisions of empire-building CEOs. The prospect of a future takeover means that CEOs with no ownership stake will over-invest in some types of projects and under-invest in others, but these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012835406
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Antitakeover Provisions, Managerial Entrenchment and Firm Innovation
Chakraborty, Atreya - 2014
number of citations to patents. Thus managers who are protected from takeover market perform worse on innovation. However …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060331
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Governance, CEO Power, and Acquisitions
Oler, Derek; Olson, Bradley; Skousen, Christopher J. - 2009
We examine whether governance matters for acquisitions. Acquisitions are frequently beneficial to the CEO of the acquiring firm, but can often be value-destructive to acquirer shareholders and other stakeholders such as employees. We find that corporate governance does not appear to influence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014049776
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The executive turnover risk premium
Peters, Florian; Wagner, Alexander F. - 2009
We establish that CEOs of companies experiencing volatile industry conditions are more likely to be dismissed. At the same time, industry risk is, accounting for various other factors, unlikely to be associated with CEO compensation other than through dismissal risk. Using this identification...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003961496
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Does CEO fitness matter?
Limbach, Peter; Sonnenburg, Florian - 2015 - This draft: November 2015
This study provides evidence suggesting that CEOs’ physical fitness has a positive impact on firm value, consistent with the beneficial effects of fitness on, e.g., cognitive functions, stress coping and job performance. For each of the years 2001 to 2011, we define S&P 1500 CEOs as fit if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392655
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CEO fitness and firm value
Limbach, Peter; Sonnenburg, Florian - 2015 - First Draft: September 2014, This Draft: May 2015
We provide evidence for a positive impact of CEO fitness on firm value (Tobin's Q). For each of the years 2001 to 2011, we define S&P 1500 CEOs as fit if they finish a marathon. Fit CEOs are associated with higher firm profitability and M&A announcement returns. Effects on firm value are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010517150
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All good things come to an end : CEO tenure and firm value
Limbach, Peter; Schmid, Markus M.; Scholz, Meik - 2015 - This draft: July 3, 2015
Our study is the first to provide systematic evidence of a hump-shaped CEO tenure-firm value relation. This pattern is supported by announcement returns to sudden CEO deaths, which mitigate endogeneity concerns. Cross-sectionally, firm value starts to decline after fewer years of CEO tenure in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011344281
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Does target CEO retention in acquisitions involving private equity acquirers harm target shareholders?
Bargeron, Leonce; Schlingemann, Frederik P.; Zutter, Chad J. - 2012
While there is widespread concern that target CEO retention by a private equity acquirer can result in a lower premium for target shareholders because of the potential conflict of interest of the CEO, it is also possible that target shareholders could benefit from CEO retention because it can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009697733