Firms covered by more analysts are more likely to become takeover targets and more likely to enter deals in which their acquirers initiate private merger negotiations. Moreover, when equity analysts' pre-acquisition price forecasts imply greater target undervaluation, target firms are more...

We examine completed M&A deals with large acquirer shareholder dollar wealth gains at announcement. We find that large-gain acquisitions are (i) typically “bolt-on” deals that are small relative to the acquirer's size; (ii) transaction-specific events (not firm- nor CEO-specific events);...

Acquirers do not benefit from hiring the CEOs of firms they buy, either in terms of merger announcement returns or long-run operating performance. This is especially true when the retained CEOs exhibit inferior quality (as proxied by target firm industrial efficiency or the target CEO's...

This paper examines the mechanisms by which acquirer CEOs are incentivized and their impact on merger decisions. We argue that the pre-merger structure of CEO wealth impacts a CEO's risk tolerance and ultimately her willingness to undertake a merger as well as the framework of the deal. As the...

This paper investigates the effects of analyst recommendations issued after a merger announcement on deal completion. We find the probability of completion increases (decreases) with the favorability of acquirer (target) recommendations. Results from instrumental variables tests support...