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We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium - CE - (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash; however we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010504452
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257515
We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium - CE - (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash; however we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010462720
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012183864
We consider coarse correlated equilibria - CCE - (Moulin and Vial 1978) for the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that CCE can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs, while correlated equilibrium - CE - (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot, because these games are potential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010643154
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012173549
We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium — CE — (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash; however...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011120263
We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium — CE — (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165286