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Collective decisions and voting : the potential for public choice

Tideman, Nicolaus; Tideman, T. Nicolaus - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003344572

Capacities and limits of democracy

Tideman, T. Nicolaus - In: The American economic review 84 (1994) 2, pp. 349-352

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001168429

Interacting double monotonicity failure with direction of impact under five voting methods

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Tideman, T. Nicolaus - In: Mathematical social sciences 67 (2014), pp. 57-66

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010461276

Selecting the runoff pair

Green-Armytage, James; Tideman, T. Nicolaus - In: Public choice 182 (2020) 1/2, pp. 119-137

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012229997

Efficient collective decision-making, marginal cost pricing, and quadratic voting

Tideman, T. Nicolaus; Plassmann, Florenz - In: Public choice 172 (2017) 1/2, pp. 45-73

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011777862

Weak Condorcet winner(s) revisited

Felsenthal, Dan S.; Tideman, T. Nicolaus - In: Public choice 160 (2014) 3/4, pp. 313-326

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010388671

Which voting rule is most likely to choose the “best” candidate?

Tideman, T. Nicolaus; Plassmann, Florenz - In: Public choice 158 (2013) 3/4, pp. 331-357

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010374591

How should votes be cast and counted?

Tideman, Nicolaus - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012880835

Which Voting Rule is Most Likely to Choose the 'Best' Candidate?

Tideman, T. Nicolaus; Plassmann, Florenz - 2012

One criterion for evaluating voting rules is the frequency with which they select the best candidate. Using a spatial model of voting that is capable of simulating data with the same statistical structure as data from actual elections, we simulate elections for which we can define the best...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176908