We consider a committee voting setup with two rounds of voting where committee members who possess private information … information in the first voting period. Coughlan (2000) shows that members reveal their information in a straw poll only if their … preferences are in fact homogeneous. By taking costs of time into account, we demonstrate that committees have strictly higher …

We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known …

a threshold number of individual votes. We investigate optimal voting rules that maximize the committee's expected …

This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule …. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in the spirit of Condorcet, a symmetric composition of committees is not always … committees. However, in the special case of only two skill levels, it is optimal to compose the committees evenly. …

Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on … characterize the social choice rules implemented by sophisticated voting on agendas with these two features. I also characterize … related to the prevailing rules for order-of-voting used by legislatures. These results establish a clear connection between …

information aggregation. Despite this, unanimity is frequently used in committees making decisions on behalf of society. This … rationale for the widespread use of unanimous voting. …

treatments (different prior and signal distributions) that pose different challenges for the voters. In one, simply voting for …

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who … characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how … correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then …