Increasing concern over corporate governance has led to calls for more shareholder in uence over corporate decisions, but allowing shareholders to vote on more issues, such as executive compensation, may not affect the quality of governance. We should expect instead that, under current rules,...

Manager incentives are viewed as being better aligned with those of shareholders when they have an ownership stake in the firms they manage. However, manager ownership can exacerbate agency problems by better enabling managers to pass shareholder resolutions. We outline a model of strategic...

In 2012 and 2013, four Australian national sporting organisations (NSOs), the Australian Football League, the Australian Rugby League Commission Limited, BA Limited (Basketball Australia) and Football Federation Australia Limited were also the national league competition organiser (NLCO) for...

I investigate the role of voting power – the ability to influence a vote's outcome – in the voting behavior of institutional shareholders. Using hand-collected data from Israel, an environment with concentrated ownership, I employ a power index borrowed from the political science literature...

I introduce a model of shareholder voting. I describe and provide characterizations of three families of shareholder voting rules: ratio rules, difference rules, and share majority rules. The characterizations rely on two key axioms: merger consistency, which requires consistency in voting...

'One-share, one-vote,' a bedrock principle of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance, is back in the spotlight. Except this time, the aim is to diminish its application rather than to extend its global footprint.Hoping to stem the tide of short-termism in the financial markets, prominent commentators...