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Voting by simultaneous vetoes

Kirneva, Margarita; Nunez, Mathias - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012543894

Making and breaking coalitions : strategic sophistication and prosociality in majority decisions

Sauermann, Jan; Schwaninger, Manuel; Kittel, Bernhard - In: European journal of political economy 71 (2022), pp. 1-13

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013345896

Positive- versus zero-sum majoritarian ultimatum games : an experimental study

Hsu, Li-chen; Yang, C. C.; Yang, Chun-lei - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 68 (2008) 3/4, pp. 498-510

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003806840

Proportional payoffs in majority games

Montero, María (contributor) - 2008

modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003675312

Focused power : experiments, the Shapley-Shubik power index, and focal points

Geller, Chris R.; Mustard, Jamie; Shahwan, Ranya - 2013

Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789971