We examine the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition...

In this study, we implement a series of voting games in the laboratory to test whether a strategic voting behavior in a proportional system would arise and induce a two-party system. In each voting game, a finite number of subjects with single-peaked preferences, uniformly distributed on a...

Ideology is widely considered to be an important factor in shaping policy outcomes and in influencing election outcomes. We propose a theory of the coalition-directed vote. The argument suggests that voters anticipate the post-election bargains negotiated among potential members of the governing...

We study legislative bargaining with two person teams versus individuals. Teams pass minimum winning coalitions significantly more often than individuals, meeting or beating the demanding truth wins criteria. Teams have more proposer power, coming significantly closer to the very unequal payoffs...

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of...