Due to technological convergence, multiple infrastructures can now offer broadband or triple-play services, while the existing access regulation is based on a single essential network. We show that continued asymmetric access regulation of one network does not control sufficiently for market...

This paper quetions whether or not mandatory unbundling delayed DSL deployment by BellSouth. By exploiting a law change in Kentucky and variation in access prices across markets, I find that deregulation in Kentucky triggered deployment, but no evidence that access prices affected deployment...

Abstract In a 2006 paper, Graeme Guthrie underlined that “[T]he impact of access price level on investment is not yet fully understood” and that “even less is known about the overall impact on welfare” (Guthrie 2006, p. 965). Although important progress has been made on the former issue,...

We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm, which is a regulated monopolist in the wholesale market and competes with an entrant in the retail market, to invest and to give access to a new wholesale technology. The new technology represents a non-drastic innovation that produces...

In this paper, we study the adjustments made by National Regulatory Authorities to simple margin squeeze tests, in order to model a reasonably efficient operator. More precisely, by inspecting the possible differences between an entrant and an incumbent that would cause a market disadvantage for...

In this paper, we study the adjustments that National Regulatory Authorities make to simple margin squeeze tests, when using them ex-ante. More precisely, by inspecting the possible differences between an entrant and the incumbent that would cause a market disadvantage for the former, we provide...

We study the impact of the access charges of copper and fiber unbundling on an incumbent's incentives to invest in fiber access networks. Once the fiber deployment is in place, the incumbent and the entrant compete for consumers in both copper and fiber markets. We show that when the regulator...

Network operators of competing infrastructures in European electronic communications markets face asymmetric regulation: incumbent telecommunications firms are required to open their networks for retail broadband competition, while cable companies have no such obligation. Furthermore, for...

This article addresses the impact of regulatory policy on levels of infrastructure deployment and derived welfare in the telecommunications sector. The model considers two potentially coexisting and partially competing techniques (the old ADSL - Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line - technique) -...

Network operators of competing infrastructures in European electronic communications markets face asymmetric regulation: incumbent telecommunications firms are required to open their networks for retail broadband competition, while cable companies have no such obligation. Furthermore, for...