Network operators of competing infrastructures in European electronic communications markets face asymmetric regulation: incumbent telecommunications firms are required to open their networks for retail broadband competition, while cable companies have no such obligation. Furthermore, for...

In this paper we study how the coexistence of access regulations for legacy (copper)and fiber networks shapes the incentives to invest in network infrastructure. To this end, we develop a theoretical model explaining investment incentives by incumbent telecom operators and heterogeneous entrants...

We study the impact of the access charges of copper and fiber unbundling on an incumbent's incentives to invest in fiber access networks. Once the fiber deployment is in place, the incumbent and the entrant compete for consumers in both copper and fiber markets. We show that when the regulator...

In this paper, we study how the coexistence of access regulations for legacy (copper) and fiber networks shapes the incentives to invest in network infrastructure. To this end, we develop a theoretical model explaining investment incentives by incumbent telecom operators and heterogeneous...

This article addresses the impact of regulatory policy on levels of infrastructure deployment and derived welfare in the telecommunications sector. The model considers two potentially coexisting and partially competing techniques (the old ADSL - Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line - technique) -...

This paper analyses how different types of access regulation to next generation networks affect investments and consumer welfare. The model consists of an investment stage with uncertain returns and subsequent quantity competition. The access price is a function of investment costs and the...

Abstract In markets with competing interconnected networks like mobile telecommunication markets investments affect the investor’s and also any competitors’ profits. In a theoretical model it is shown that cost-reducing investments reduce the investor’s termination rates and increase...

We propose a price-cap mechanism for electricity-transmission expansion based on redefining transmission output in terms of financial transmission rights. Our mechanism applies the incentive-regulation logic of rebalancing a two-part tariff. First, we test this mechanism in a three-node network....

Electricity transmission has become the pivotal industry segment for electricity restructuring. Yet, little is known about the shape of transmission cost functions. Reasons for this can be a lack of consensus about the definition of transmission output and the complexitity of the relationship...

This paper models competition between two firms, which provide broadband Internet access in regional markets with different population densities. The firms, an incumbent and an entrant, differ in two ways. First, consumers bear costs when switching to the entrant. Second, the entrant faces a...