Showing 1 - 7 of 7
Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection.This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. Dynamicauction theory with private value highlights more aggressive bidding by uninformedbidders and higher prices when an informed participant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868840
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003881110
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003596253
Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection. This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. Dynamic auction theory with private value highlights more aggressive bidding by uninformed bidders and higher prices when an informed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003966182
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001719700
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000993037
Evidence on adverse selection in slave markets remains inconclusive. We study this question through notarial acts on public slave auctions in Mauritius between 1825 and 1835, involving 4,286 slaves. In addition to slave characteristics, the acts document the identities of buyers and sellers. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059543