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Fairness, adverse selection, and employment contracts

Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005

extent of their fairness concerns. Fairness is modelled as inequity aversion, where fair-minded workers suffer if their … colleagues get more income net of production costs. Screening workers with equal productivity but different fairness concerns is … the fraction of fair-minded workers. As a result, fairness might influence the employment contracts of all workers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366541

Fairness, adverse selection, and employment contracts

Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005 - This Version: July 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440434

Peer pressure with inequity aversion

Choi, Kangsik; Han, Jae Joon; Lee, Seo-Hyeong - In: The Korean economic review 34 (2018) 2, pp. 131-155

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011950719

The Effect of Irrelevant Information on Adverse Selection in a Signaling Game

Viceisza, Angelino - 2012

We find an effect of irrelevant information on adverse selection in a laboratory signaling game. This effect occurs via two channels: the principal is more (less) likely to adversely reject signals from “good” (“bad”) types. The findings suggest that “perception (or perhaps,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115007

Voluntary disclosure of private information and unraveling in the market for lemons : an experiment

Benndorf, Volker - In: Games 9 (2018) 2/23, pp. 1-17

We experimentally analyze a lemons market with a labor-market framing. Sellers are referred to as “workers” and have the possibility to provide “employers” with costly but credible information about their “productivity”. Economic theory suggests that in this setup, unraveling takes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849512

Optimal contract under asymmetric information about fairness

Pavlov, Valery; Katik, Elena; Zhang, Wen - In: Manufacturing & service operations management : M & SOM 24 (2022) 1, pp. 305-314

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012818366

Self-selection and the efficiency of tournaments

Eriksson, Tor (contributor); Teyssier, Sabrina (contributor) - 2006

When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003283430

Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments

Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2023

The literature has shown that the overall efficiency of exogenously imposed tournaments is reduced by a high variance in performance. This paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self-select into different payment schemes is reducing the variability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014255631

Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard

Ulbricht, Robert - 2014

The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358239

Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication

Bester, Helmut; Strausz, Roland - 2004 - Version 1.3, December 2004

This paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal-agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature's common, but overly restrictive focus on one-shot, direct communication. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361996

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