We allow buyers to choose the timing of offers in a dynamic adverse selection model with a single seller. Buyers have private information and can delay their one-time private offers to learn from other buyers by observing trading behavior. We find that the equilibrium exhibits maximum delay in...

We study a dynamic trading game in which the information asymmetry between the agents develops over time. A seller and potential buyers start out symmetrically uninformed about the quality of a good, but the seller becomes informed after the game begins. We show that this developing adverse...

Many service industries, including the medical and legal professions in some countries, display a gated structure. Rather than approaching a final producer directly, a consumer will first seek a referral from an intermediary. In this paper, we provide one possible explanation for such an...

I prove an efficiency result for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in which one player's utility is privately known and evolves according to a Markov process. Under certain assumptions, patient players can attain approximately efficient payoffs in equilibrium. The public signal...

This paper studies a novel dynamic principle agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model an expert whose skills are his private information, faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Each task's level of difficulty is an...

We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. In an evolutionary learning set-up, which is imitative, principals can have different beliefs about the distribution of agents' types in the population. The resulting nonlinear dynamic...

We study market dynamics when an owner learns over time about the quality of her asset. Since this information is private, the owner sells strategically to a less informed buyer following sufficient negative information. In response, market prices feature a "U-shape" relative to the length of...

The health care industry in some countries displays a gated structure. Rather than approaching a specialist directly, a patient will first seek a referral from a general practitioner. We provide one possible explanation for such an industry structure. If the outcome of treatment depends on the...

The analysis of adverse selection problems in seller-buyer relationships has typically been based on the assumption that private information is uncertifiable, while in practice it may well be certifiable. If a buyer has certifiable private information, he can conceal evidence, but he cannot...

We provide several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent's strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such...