We develop a model in which large risk-neutral firms and individual risk-averse consumers compete to employ heterogeneous workers by posting compensation menus. Production takes time, and we analyze how screening motives interact with the desire to smooth consumption. There is a unique symmetric...

We develop a model in which large risk-neutral firms and individual risk-averse consumers compete to employ heterogeneous workers by posting compensation menus. Production takes time, and we analyze how screening motives interact with the desire to smooth consumption. There is a unique symmetric...

This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...

The employer-sponsored life insurance (ESLI) market is particularly susceptible to adverse selection due to community-rated premiums, guaranteed issue coverage, and the existence of a well-functioning individual market as a substitute. Using administrative payroll and healthcare claims data from...

This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...

We analyze the expected value of information about an agent's type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information about the agent's type enables the principal to sort/screen agents of different types. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the...

This paper studies a principal-agent model in which the principal and agent are risk-neutral, there are two actions, adverse selection, moral hazard and limited liability. When the two actions are subject to moral hazard, there is no distortion at the top, the optimal action profile is downward...

We develop a model wherein a risk-neutral but ambiguity-averse principal contracts with a risk-averse agent who has a risky project. Both the agent and the principal can observe the project output and a public signal. The correlation between the output and the public signal is private...

The employer-sponsored life insurance (ESLI) market is particularly susceptible to adverse selection due to community-rated premiums, guaranteed issue coverage, and the existence of a well-functioning individual market as a substitute. Using administrative payroll and healthcare claims data from...

This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on performance pay and other...