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The management of talent for innovation : optimal contracting for selection and incentives
Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo - 2018
Optimally reallocating human capital to tasks is key for an organization to successfully navigate a transition. We study how to design employment contracts to allocate employees to different valuable projects within an organization given two simultaneous challenges: The employees have private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980048
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Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services
Levaggi, Rosella; Moretto, Michele; Pertile, Paolo - 2023
This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014342117
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When trust fades... : can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?
Major, Iván - 2013
design I prove in the paper, that government - as principal - is only capable of applying "perverse" incentives towards the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211955
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Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Gershkov, Alex; Perry, Motty - 2010
This paper studies a novel dynamic principle agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model an expert whose skills are his private information, faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Each task's level of difficulty is an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195069
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Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Ulbricht, Robert - 2014
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358239
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Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014
We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically … with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may … power of incentives later in the relationship. Our results follow from a new variational approach that permits us to tackle …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876
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Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Ulbricht, Robert - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 253-278
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672191
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Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and Type-Dependent Reservation Utilities
Packham, Natalie - 2015
In a continuous-time setting where a risk-averse agent controls the drift of an output process driven by a Brownian motion, optimal contracts are linear in the terminal output; this result is well-known in a setting with moral hazard and - under stronger assumptions - adverse selection. Using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013020053
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Staged-Financing Contracts with Private Information
Wang, Hefei - 2008
This paper studies the use of incentive contracts in the Bolton-Scharfstein (1990) model when some agents in the population are technically constrained from falsifying reports and stealing cash. The original Bolton-Scharfstein contract may not be optimal for a large range of parametric values....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057550
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Optimal Contract Under Moral Hazard with Soft Information
Roger, Guillaume - 2012
two problems independently; the ex post incentive for misreporting interacts with the ex ante incentives for effort. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111160