Similar Search Results

The management of talent for innovation : optimal contracting for selection and incentives

Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo - 2018

Optimally reallocating human capital to tasks is key for an organization to successfully navigate a transition. We study how to design employment contracts to allocate employees to different valuable projects within an organization given two simultaneous challenges: The employees have private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980048

When trust fades... : can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?

Major, Iván - 2013

design I prove in the paper, that government - as principal - is only capable of applying "perverse" incentives towards the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211955

Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Gershkov, Alex; Perry, Motty - 2010

This paper studies a novel dynamic principle agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model an expert whose skills are his private information, faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Each task's level of difficulty is an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195069

Control and contract design in research collaborations : a complete contract perspective

Panico, Claudio - In: International journal of industrial organization 30 (2012) 5, pp. 459-470

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658141

Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes

Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014

We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically … with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may … power of incentives later in the relationship. Our results follow from a new variational approach that permits us to tackle …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876

Incentives and Equilibrium in Agency with Adverse Selection

Faynzilberg, Peter S. - 2015

We show that contracting in agency with voluntary participation may involve incentives for the agent's abstention …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021575

A structural model of a multitasking salesforce : incentives, private information, and job design

Kim, Minkyung; Sudhir, K.; Uetake, Kosuke - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 68 (2022) 6, pp. 4602-4630

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013369092

Push or pull? : performance-pay, incentives, and information

Rietzke, David; Chen, Yu - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864842

Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services

Levaggi, Rosella; Moretto, Michele; Pertile, Paolo - 2023

This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014342117

The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent

Maréchal, François; Thomas, Lionel - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/12, pp. 1-22

satisfy because of the different kinds of incentives to be managed and the overall trade-off between rent extraction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849217