This paper presents a model in which cash holding imposes a negative externality because it worsens future adverse selection in markets for long-term assets, which impairs their role for liquidity provision. Adverse selection worsens when potential sellers of long-term assets hold more cash...

Secondary markets for long-term assets might be illiquid due to adverse selection. In a model in which moral hazard is confined to project initiation, I find that: (1) when agents expect a liquidity dry-up on such markets, they optimally choose to self-insure through the hoarding of...

We provide new international evidence for a monetary policy liquidity transmission channel in the United States, United Kingdom, and the Eurozone. The central banks of these countries are, with a different degree, able to soften the economic downward spiral after an unexpected arrival of a...

Market distress can be the catalyst of a deleveraging wave, as in the 2007/08 financial crisis. This paper demonstrates how market distress and deleveraging can fuel each other in the presence of adverse selection problems in asset markets. At the core of the detrimental feedback loop is agents'...