There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax...

The value of information regarding risk class for a monopoly insurer and its customers is examined in both symmetric and asymmetric information environments. A monopolist always prefers contracting with uninformed customers as this maximizes the rent extracted under symmetric information while...

This chapter reviews recent theoretical work on the design of regulatory policy, focusing on the complications that arise when regulated suppliers have better information about the regulated industry than do regulators. The discussion begins by characterizing the optimal regulation of a monopoly...

ResumenSe ha considerado el comportamiento del sector eléctrico como un factor de gran trascendencia en desenvolvimiento de la economía de un país. Sin embargo, es notable el desconocimiento de algunas personas no especialistas es esta temática, de los conceptos básicos y de la...

Many economists are aware that the conditions for the efficiency and monopolization in a partial equilibrium framework are the extremes of the Ramsey–Boiteux formula when the Lagrange multiplier for the budget varies. We formalize the duality existing between the welfarist and monopolist...

This paper presents an analysis of the market for checks using the monopoly problem as an approximation. The need for such an analysis arises due to the following policy proposal: from time to time, the Turkish government considers increasing the lump-sum amount that drawee banks are legally...

This paper develops a simple model of the market for checks in Turkey. The Central Bank controls the lump-sum amount that the drawee banks are legally responsible to pay per bad check. An increase in this amount is believed to support real economy. I show that banks will tend to restrict the...

We discuss network neutrality regulation of the Internet in the context of a two-sided market model. Platforms sell broadband Internet access services to residential consumers and may set fees to content and application providers on the Internet. When access is monopolized, cross-group...

We illustrate conditions under which a trade platform selling its own products alongside third-party sellers benefits or harms consumers. This benefits consumers by lowering prices in a suite of models: a gatekeeper platform facing a competitive fringe of sellers, when fringe sellers also have...

The authors explain why the elementary logic of rate-of-return regulation generates not the competitive outcome but the monopoly outcome. Within the framework of the "passive regulator" that this logic entails, public regulation cannot alter the monopoly outcome, but can only change the form in...