The value of information regarding risk class for a monopoly insurer and its customers is examined in both symmetric and asymmetric information environments. A monopolist always prefers contracting with uninformed customers as this maximizes the rent extracted under symmetric information while...

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

Purpose: Operational risks appear as the main threats of the modern world. Mistakes made by employees, an imperfect information systems or changes in the law can cause losses that businesses today are not even able to estimate. Therefore, in the face of widespread the asymmetry of information,...

When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an equilibrium where each health plan offers a single...

In a relatively recent paper, Gehrig and Stenbacka (Eur Econ Rev 51, 77–99, 2007) show that information sharing increases banks’ profits to the detriment of creditworthy entrepreneurs in a model of a banking duopoly with switching costs and poaching. They restrict their analysis to the case...

Commercial banks are typical hierarchical organizations, in which the multipleprincipal-agent problem exists and induces serious internal collusive corruption. This article analyzes the collusive corruption between credit supervisors and credit managers in bank credit activities, through three...

Der Markt für Riester-Produkte ist intransparent. In diesem Artikel wird gezeigt, warum die Informationsasymmetrien zu Lasten der Verbraucher nicht durch den Markt aufgelöst werden können, sondern nur durch staatliche Vorgaben. Eine empirische Erhebung verdeutlicht, dass auch die...

When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity,...