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Competition Leverage : How the Demand Side Affects Optimal Risk Adjustment
Bijlsma, Michiel - 2011
We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low-risk consumers. First, we find that insurers still have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123527
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Asymmetric information : evidence from the home insurance market
Aarbu, Karl Ove - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008655509
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Asymmetric Information – Evidence from the Home Insurance Market
Aarbu, Karl Ove - 2010
In this paper I test whether asymmetric information is present in the home insurance market. To detect the existence of asymmetric information I apply the so-called positive correlation test to a dataset containing approximately 500,000 home insurance contracts gathered from a Norwegian insurer....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137935
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Asymmetric information in the home insurance market
Aarbu, Karl Ove - In: The journal of risk and insurance : the journal of the … 84 (2017) 1, pp. 35-72
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011658175
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Physician payment contracts in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection : the theory and its application to Ontario
Kantarevic, Jasmin; Kralj, Boris - 2015
behavior. These features include: (1) physicians can choose a payment contract from a menu that includes an enhanced fee … blended capitation contract; (3) physicians sort selectively into the contracts based on their preferences; and (4) physicians … in the blended capitation model provide fewer services than physicians in the enhanced fee-for-service model. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288527
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Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection : The Theory and its Application to Ontario
Kantarevic, Jasmin - 2015
behavior. These features include: (1) physicians can choose a payment contract from a menu that includes an enhanced fee … blended capitation contract; (3) physicians sort selectively into the contracts based on their preferences; and (4) physicians … in the blended capitation model provide fewer services than physicians in the enhanced fee-for-service model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013016351
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Government Lending As a Tool to Mitigate the Effect of Asymmetric Information
Park, Sangkyun - 2021
This paper analyzes the effect of asymmetric information on investment efficiency and the ways in which government credit can mitigate the inefficiency caused by asymmetric information. The inefficiency caused by asymmetric information critically depends on the way in which the project return is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013227707
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(M)oral hazard?
Grönqvist, Erik (contributor) - 2006
Would you go to the dentist more often if it were free? Observational data is here used to analyze the impact of full-coverage insurance on dental care utilization using different identification strategies. The challenge of assessing the bite of moral hazard without an experimental study design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003393203
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How complex are the contracts offered by health plans?
Olivella, Pau; Vera-Hernandez, Marcos - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 1 (2010) 3, pp. 305-323
When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an equilibrium where each health plan offers a single...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009355904
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Adverse selection and private health insurance coverage in India : a rational behaviour model of insurance agents under asymmetric information
Vellakkal, Sukumar - 2009
In the backdrop of the low level of health insurance coverage in India, this study examines the determinants of the scaling-up process of health insurance by analyzing the rational behaviour of an insurance agent facing a trade-off between selling ‘health insurance’ and ‘other forms of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003817275