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Optimally reallocating human capital to tasks is key for an organization to successfully navigate a transition. We study how to design employment contracts to allocate employees to different valuable projects within an organization given two simultaneous challenges: The employees have private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980048
Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has … incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contracts; thus, in the optimal contract …, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075605
We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the interim distribution of types is common knowledge (the exact number of agents for each type is known), then a mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345986
We analyze the expected value of information about an agent's type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information about the agent's type enables the principal to sort/screen agents of different types. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012860920
We analyze the expected value of information about an agent's type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information about the agent's type enables the principal to sort/screen agents of different types. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841554
A basic tenet of incentive theory states that there is a trade-off between risk and incentives. By implication, greater …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014088114
We develop a model in which large risk-neutral firms and individual risk-averse consumers compete to employ heterogeneous workers by posting compensation menus. Production takes time, and we analyze how screening motives interact with the desire to smooth consumption. There is a unique symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015110615
We develop a model in which large risk-neutral firms and individual risk-averse consumers compete to employ heterogeneous workers by posting compensation menus. Production takes time, and we analyze how screening motives interact with the desire to smooth consumption. There is a unique symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015125404
choose between (low-powered) team incentives and (high-powered) individual incentives. We observe that subjects exhibiting … high trust or reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual … incentives, workers who chose team incentives perform worse if both the unobservable interdependency between workers and their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381025
We analyze the new selection of teachers in basic and media education in Antioquia as an adverse selection problem. We have known the non-teaching professionals are going relatively well in the written tests, but lose that advantage in the analysis of their curriculum vitae (they usually do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008544174