Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 1,849
Cover Image
A note on uniqueness in game-theoretic foundations of the reactive equilibrium
Mimra, Wanda; Wambach, Achim - 2014
Riley (1979)'s reactive equilibrium concept addresses problems of equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection. The game-theoretic interpretation of the reactive equilibrium concept in Engers and Fernandez (1987) yields the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976)/Riley (1979)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010419870
Cover Image
Negative externalities and equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection
Siemens, Ferdinand von; Kosfeld, Michael - 2009
on existing theories of competition in markets with adverse selection. -- Asymmetric information ; competition ; adverse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003831629
Cover Image
Competitive Insurance Markets and Adverse Selection in the Lab
Riahi, Dorra - 2010
We provide an experimental analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. Our parameterized version of the lemons' model (Akerlof 1970) in the insurance context predicts total crowding out of low-risks when insurers offer a single full insurance contract. The therapy proposed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137823
Cover Image
Competition and Price Transparency in the Market for Lemons : Experimental Evidence
Bochet, Olivier - 2020
design an experiment to examine the impact of competition and price transparency in such settings. Consistent with the … theoretical predictions, we find that competition promotes efficiency if bargainers cannot observe each other's price offers …. Contrary to the predictions, however, the efficiency-enhancing effect of competition persists even when offers are observable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854487
Cover Image
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons
Attar, Andrea; Mariotti, Thomas; Salanié, François - 2009
We consider an exchange economy in which a seller can trade an endowment of a divisible good whose quality she privately knows. Buyers compete in menus of non-exclusive contracts, so that the seller may choose to trade with several buyers. In this context, we show that an equilibrium always...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199733
Cover Image
The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2001
A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262549
Cover Image
The virtue of being underestimated : a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2001 - This Version: June 2001
A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539692
Cover Image
The virtue of being underestimated : a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2001
A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011403219
Cover Image
The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models
Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2001
A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761912
Cover Image
Continuous time trading in markets with adverse selection
Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - 2000
We investigate the nature of the adverse selection problem in a market for adurable goodwhere trading and entry of new buyers and sellers takes place in continuoustime. In thecontinuous time model equilibria with properties that are qualitativelydifferent from thestatic equilibria, emerge....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304379